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"NO WORST THERE IS NONE"? TANZANIAN POLITICAL ECONOMIC 
CRISES 1978 - ????
by Reginald Herbold Green^
A man who has inherited a tumbledown cottage 
has to live in even worse conditions while he 
is rebuilding it and making a decent house for 
himself.
We have only two rights in the present world
economic system, to s’ell cheap and to buy dear.
Mistakes are mistakes.
- President Julius K. Nyerere 
"Here We Go Round The Mulberry Bush..."
The political economic and socio political crises now confronting 
Tanzania are appalling and unprecedented in their intensity and 
duration. The only vaguely comparable crisis - that of 1974-1975 
was both much less severe (especially in human terms) and lasted
at most 24 months (versus at least 45 to date for the present one)
Worse,no rational projections (on anybody's strategic model) now 
available give any cause for expecting a significant upturn or 
even a firm consolidation at present levels. The reality is of 
accelerating deterioration with no evidence that the worst is 
about to pass or even where the bottom of the precipice is.
Worst,this result is not one achieved by an absence of response 
but in spite of energetic and draconic responses which have 
imposed major sacrifices on most social and economic groups 
(including the decision makers) but so far to no very evident 
purpose beyond slowing the vertiginous decline from what it 
otherwise might have been. Analytically and operationally the
informed, detached observer is increasingly plunged into 
the worlds of Eliot's "Hollow Men" who shore up fragments 
of a lost dream, wander in circles and experience the end 
of their world "not with a bang but with a whimper"; 
cf "Coriolon: Ode To A Statesman" whose musings on institu­
tional reform and diplomatic negotiation end in "the rising 
cry of the people: Resign! Resign! Resign!"; or of Yeats' 
"Second Coming" where, as"things fall apart" and the "centre 
cannot hold", "mere anarchy is based upon the world" and a 
violent apocalypse moves nearer to birth.
If those visions become the perceptions of Tanzanians 
and Tanzanian leaders, the crises will become insoluble and 
the end of the road (however different its actual milestones) 
will be that of Ghana, of Zaire and of Uganda. To date this 
one clearly positive element is that Tanzanians, Tanzanian 
decision takers and Tanzanian analysts still (if with growing 
doubts and increasing twings of despair) still hold to Dylan 
Thomas' dictum "Do not go silent into that good, but rage, 
rage against the dying of the light" and that of Gramsci to 
proceed with pessimism of the intellect but optimism of the 
will.
1982 - "Alms for Oblivion"?
A quick sketch of the political economic crises in Tanzania
in 1982 can perhaps best be presented in an order of driving
forces and interactions even if this is necessarily too
2unidimensional and abstracts from feedbacks.
There is a visible trade gap equal to about 100% of exports3and perhaps 10-12%% of GDP. This is true despite imports 
being held down to $1,000 million odd as opposed to $1,250- 
1,400 million required to maintain capital stock, operate 
basic services (e.g. health, education, water) fully 
effectively and operate the industrial and agricultural 
sectors at reasonable output to capacity ratios. Attempts to 
handle this gap have over 1979-1982 led to the buildup of about 
$300 million of trade arrears, $100 million of short term 
external commercial bank credits $200 million in short term
supplier credits and $20 million in delayed long term 
debt service - about 120% of annual export earnings. Debt 
service including amortisation in the near future will 
stand at 20% to 30% of export earnings (the very wide range4relating to how rapidly one assumes arrears to be cleared) 
as opposed to 6-8% in the early 1970's.
The direct result of the import squeeze is to hold operation
of domestic manufacturing to perhaps 35% (versus about 70% 
in 1977 and 1978) with the trend rapidly downward and 
1978-1982 absolute decline likely to be over 40%. Given 
that the incremental import/exfactory value of manufactured 
output ratio is about 4 to 1, and virtually no consumer manu­
factured goods are imported, the impact on availability of 
basic consumer goods and construction materials is draconic. 
Similarly because Sales Tax on domestic manufactures plus 
company tax on their producers accounts for about half of 
Recurrent Revenue (even at 1981/82 depressed levels)recurrent 
revenue at Sh 8,800 million is about Sh 4,000 million below
what it would be had output risen slowly over 1979-82 instead
of declining steeply.
The impact of import constraints on agriculture is harder to 
quantify. In respect to food production it relates primarily 
to inadequate transport and secondarily to input supply while 
in respect to industrial/export crops the input impact is 
greater and compounded by inadequate capacity and capacity 
utiliseability in processing. The total cost in production 
and availability may be of theorder of 3-5% for food and over 
10% for industrial/export crops. If these orders of magnitude 
are correct,the loss of exports is about 10% ($50 million) and 
the impact on food imports $30 million (half of present grain 
imports) and on domestically produced urban and quasi urban 
food supply 15-25%.5
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The government bank borrowing requirement in 1981/82 was 
about Sh 3,000 million (16% of GDP) - a very slight improve­
ment over 1979/80 - 1980/81 in proportional terms but a 
deterioration in absolute ones and a level likely to at 
best remain about constant as a proportion of GDP in 1982/83.6 
This is despite real (constant price) cuts in basic public 
service expenditure (excluding defense, debt service and 
parastatal reconstruction and interim subsidization) over 
the past two years of perhaps 10-15% with another 6-10% cut 
in 1982/83. To have held real provision of basic public 
services per capita stable and provided for adequate 
maintenance of infrastructure would have added perhaps 
Sh 1,500-1,750 million in 1981/82. That would have meant 
a bank borrowing level of Sh 4,500-4,750. It is worth 
contrasting this to the Sh 4,000 million revenue loss from the 
import capacity squeeze on manufacturing in that Sh 500-750 
million (1% of GDP) would be a prudent (or too austere) bank 
borrowing level.
The mechanism of inflation generation - about 20% in 1979,
30% in 1980, 25% in 1981, probably at least 30% in 1982 on7a cost of living basis - is only too clear. Reduced 
government revenue base leading to a broad recurrent budget 
deficit (versus a 1961-1977 record of unbroken, modest to 
moderate surpluses) combined with reduced availability ofomanufactured goods and certain preferred foods is a perfect 
recipe for rapid inflation and - if continued - for hyperin­
flation at Ghanaian or Argentinian rates of 50-100% a year.
The human impact is equally clear. Average personal consumption9power in 1982 is of the order of 20% below 1977 - in one 
sense as a result of the 50% fall in the external terms of 
trade directly on purchasing power of constant price notional 
output and indirectly through the multiplied impact of import 
compression on output. The main losers are urban salary,
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small scale self employed and wage earners. Rural purchasing 
power changes are not homegenous - both weather and price/output 
trends for particular crops vary widely - but on average the 
fall is much less severe.^ The gainers are - inevitably under 
the circumstances - 'entrepreneurs of adversity' ranging from 
basically reputable producers/dealers of scarce goods (including 
some peasants) to pure fixers, bribe takers and shortage 
creator/exploiters.
In respect to public services the decline is in quality and 
reliability - coverage and quantity have continued to increase 
absolutely and even on a per capita basis for basic health-water- 
education services,though not for urban services. It is 
illustrated by the proportion of clinics frequently without basic 
drugs, schools with few texts or other materials, rural water 
units out of operation pending maintenance. The pharmaceutical 
availability to need ratio is at best 50% and at worst 25%, the 
out of service ratio of rural water supply at any one time is at 
least 25-33%.
Both in respect to personal consumer goods and services and to 
public service access,pure price change and reliability data 
understate the human hardship for two reasons. First, getting 
what is available (especially if one cannot afford to pay over 
the going rate via a 'parallel market1 or a bribe) takes far more 
time hunting and queuing than at any time in the previous 20 years. 
Second, the opportunities for corruption, favouritism and abuse 
of power (as trader or as official) are maximised in a context 
of extreme shortages with the far away (physically), poor 
and individually non-powerful the chief victims.
While to date the drive toward greater equity (lesser inequality 
in consuming power, access to public servieces and participation 
in decisions) has not been reversed, it has faltered - eg no 
minimum wage increase in 1982 after a year of 25% inflation - and, 
to the extent it survives,squeezes middle income groups, not the 
most obnoxious exploiters. Further., the process of absolute
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poverty eradication has been reversed - redistribution is out 
of decline not growth (including decline in national and 
communal total ability to take/implement decisions).
The impact on morale, expectations and both personal and national 
self respect are both evident and critical. It is not evident 
that hard work, commitment and honesty lead to personal, communal 
and national development. On the face of it nothing works and 
one is a plaything of forces beyond his or his leaders' control. 
The incentives for despair, cynicism, passive 'going through 
the motions', febrile grasping at straws or "each for himself and 
the devil take the hindmost" are only too dangerously clear as 
are their first fruits of corruption, inefficiency and anomie 
The present levels of these - shocking by Tanzanian standards 
but less so by global or African - are neither fatal nor irrever­
sible; it is the trend which is cause for grave alarm.
1972-78 "Facile Descensus Avernum"
11The present contains both the past and the future - and the 
past, the present and past of the future. To understand the 
present and to shape the future requires an interpretation of 
the past. This is especially true in the case of Tanzania because 
as recently as 1977 none of the facets of the 1982 survey of 
crises existed in any overt or severe form. Overall the balance 
of payments was in surplus, external reserves were nearly six 
months (versus six days or hours) imports, the recurrent budget 
surplus was over 3% of GDP, inflation was in the 6-8% a year 
range, food surpluses (not deficits) predominated, real GDP growth 
was around 6%, the terms of trade were at about the same level as 
in 1961 and better than in any intervening year, the confidence 
of a major crisis surmounted and of palpably renewed progress 
dominated most individual and national perceptions. Looking back 
one seems to see another country in another era in another world.
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12In 1972 Tanzania's economy was basically in balance (external 
and domestic), moving ahead and showing a sustained development 
dynamic. 1964-66 (income distribution, incipient fiscal and 
inflation) and 1969-71 (external balance, credit management) 
crises had largely been overcome and overcome by means which 
strengthened institutional and decision taking capacity.
1973 appeared to be similar. In fact the bad harvest combined with 
grain, oil, fertiliser and manufactured goods world price increases 
and the downswing of some commodity prices (including several 
critical to Tanzania) meant that by the year's end the prospects 
were for a massive, externally triggered crisis.
Over 1974-75 the crisis emerged - external reserves vanished, terms 
of trade worsened sharply (on the order of 10% of GDP loss over 
1972-75 on UNCTD estimates), the Recurrent Budget surplus 
virtually vanished, domestic credit creation expanded, import 
constraints crippled growth, prices rose sharply while real wages 
and real grower prices fell.
However, this was within a coherent short term policy framework 
worked out over early 1974 and adopted in April. The price changes 
(about 40% from late 1974 to April 1975) were deliberate and 
structural and balanced with minimum wage, grower price for food 
and tax changes. The goals were to sustain the growth and dev­
elopment trend (including basic service access expansion), limit 
low income group consumption compression, return to a 10% or 
less inflation rate, hold the Recurrent Budget in balance and 
seek substantial external bridging finance over 1974/75 - 1976/77 
until supply increases (better weather, more food production 
incentives, completing basic product capacity coverage in manu­
facturing, reversing export stagnation) closed the domestic and 
external gaps.
By late 1975 it was clear (as it had not been earlier in the 
year) that the strategy and most of the tactics were working. 
Unfortunately the two that were not - speedy completion of 
manufacturing projects and export rehabilitation and development -
were lost to sight in 1976 and 1977. The beverage boom (price 
explosion for coffee, and to a lesser extent tea, consequential 
on Brazilian frost) raised real import capacity while reduced 
compression of imported inputs and spares bolstered manufactured 
goods output.
Further during this period food procurement storage, marketing and 
finance as well as agricultural pricing broke down (not known 
until 1979) and fiscal and foreign exchange policy became lax 
in a way only sustainable so long as the beverage boom lasted.
When it collapsed in 1973., both external and internal balances 
were lost though not so rapidly or visibly as in early 1974. As 
a result no serious, across the board policy response was seen 
to be necessary even though by the last quarter of 1978 one was 
clearly headed for reserve exhaustion, Recurrent Budget deficit, 
inflationary credit expansion (government and food marketing) 
and shortages in the first half of 1979.
The Amin invasion of late 1978 and its consequences over 1979-81 
had a very negative threefold impact ¡ direct costs of the order 
of $700 million (with a heavy foreign exchange component); indirect 
costs of rendering recovery of external and fiscal balance 
impossible so long as the war lasted; focusing attention away 
from the economic crisis in general and its more underlying 
medium term components in particular. Compounding these results 
was the onset of the 1979-198? run of bad harvests (following 
are equally unprecedently long (1976-78 run of good ones) and 
the discovery of the non-viability of national storage and, 
therefore, non-existence of supposed food reserves.
Until late 1979 the situation could be described as unmanaged 
and partly unrecognised crises. During 1979-80 drastic efforts 
were begun to achieve fiscal, foreign exchange, credit and overall 
domestic balance management. Success was limited both by 
successive discoveries of new adverse adjustments (previously 
hidden agricultural sector losses, worsening terms of trade, 
breakdown of IMF and World Bank programmes or programme negotiations) 
and a failure to achieve a coherent, workable strategy comparable
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to that of 1974 or to achieve a similar degree of consistent
1 3articulation and disciplined implementation. Thus the
1 4apparant consolidation achieved in 1980 was either illus-ory 
or transient and 1981 was marked by renewed deterioration which 
accelerated in 1982. While the period was marked by a number 
of policy and partial strategy initiatives these tended to lack 
coherence and to be overwhelmed by events before becoming 
operational rather than to serve as any chart for crisis 
management.  ^^
To Talk of Many Things: of Causes, Cabbages and Kings
Two exogenous event causes can be stated briefly: the Amin
invasion and consequential war and attempt to provide interim
security for Uganda to allow elections and the emergence of a
Ugandan chosen and supported government and the shift from the
previous one good/one bad year basic weather cycle to the 1973-1974
bad, 1975 fair, 1976-1978 good, 1979-1982 bad pattern of the past
ten years (with a most unfortunate correlation of bad years with
ones which were difficult on other counts as well). Their total
1 6net cost has been the order of $1,000-1,200 million, albeit 
this is partly (say 10-15%) the result of inept agricultural 
policy including relative price setting, output mix incentives 
and storage.
External balance crisis causation includes terms of trade, 
export volume decline, debt service increase, initial laxity in 
controlling imports and using supplier credit and the levels 
and making of external resource inflows.
1982 import purchasing power per unit of exports is about half
1972/3 or 1976/7.^ 1980 export volume was 15-20% below 1972/3
(or 1965/67). The 1981 improvement was of the order of 10-15%
1 8but has not been sustained. Had 1981 terms of trade and export
volume been the same as 1972/3 (or 1961/3 or 1976/7) export 
earnings would have covered about 110-120% of actual imports and 
85-95% of minimum necessary imports. The export volume lag is
- 9 -
*partly the result of the declining terms of trade, partly 
of unsound price policy, partly of inadequate micro export 
promotion policies and projects but perhaps most of a lack 
of any clear strategic priority being given to exports until 
1980 or any attempt to articulate an export strategy until 
1981.19
Debt service increases come partly from bunching of initial 
repayments on World Bank and Chinese loans, partly from commercial 
and debt service arrears which must be reduced, but substantially 
from an unwise 1978-80 laxity in cutting back on imports 
(leading to arrears) and attempting to sustain investment 
by use of supplier credit without attention to future consequences. 
Tighter import controls in 1978/9 and systematic analysis of 
supplier credit proposals might have reduced present debt by 
$200-250 million.20
External financial inflows have risen over 1977-82 (albeit in
real terms they are now declining and within them concessional
finance has probably never regained 1973/4 real per capita 
21levels ). Makeup problems include the "use" of arrears, 
supplier credits and short term borrowings (e.g.IMF) and the 
share of concessional finance linked to expanding capacity 
rather than allowing fuller maintenance and use of what 
exists. Long term commercial bank borrowing has been 
negligible; private direct investment has been negligible 
and its prospects turn on the outturn of studies/negotiations 
toward major natural resource projects (oil, gas, coal, nickel, 
uranium).^ 2
Agricultural performance has on the food side been a secondary
cause of the crises and on the industrial/export crop one a
significant one. The trend growth rate of 3 to 4% has been
sustained but within this industrial/export crop growth has
been negative and 1979-8? bad weather means 1982 output is 
23below trend.
-  10 -
Agricultural policy and institutional performance has been
- l i ­
the major domestic "contribution" to crises. Relative prices 
went haywire over 1975-79 leading to a fall of two thirds in 
output (or more accurately picking) of the most promising 
export (cashew) arid huge switches to several traditional, 
drought resistant crops whose surpluses could neither be 
stored nor exported except at massive losses (to the 
marketing body and relative to the more plausible exports 
priced out for cassava, millet, sorghum and pigeon peas). 
Storage was not developed plausibly (both high and low 
technology expert advice when acted on led to debacles) so 
that 1976-1978 surpluses led to 600,000 tonnes spoiled, 
strayed, fed to poultry or exported (the last two to 
avert spoilage)^ not to the reserves which would have 
covered 1979-1982 maize deficits.
Production targets (decentralized by crop and area) were 
abandoned after 1973 and not reinstated until 1979 while 
articulation of coherent relations of policies and inputs 
to targets was not even addressed until, perhaps, 1980/81. 
Transport problems multiplied - partly as a result of import 
constraints and the war but partly as a result of bad manage­
ment of public sector and ineffective hiring of private 
sector vehicles combined with a tendency to maximise number 
and total distance of movements between producer and point 
of use/export and to posit total reliance on road even when 
rail would have been cheaper.
As a direct result, all but one or two marketing authorities 
fell into major deficits - exacerbated but not caused by 
internal inefficiencies (especially tea, tobacco, pyrethrum) 
and loss of volume raising per unit fixed costs (especially 
cotton, cashew). The National Milling Corporation achieved 
total 1977/78 - 1980/81 losses of about $250 million. These 
results were largely unknown until 1980 or even 1981 because 
of monitoring consisting of oversights and, in several cases, 
an incredible deterioration in accounting.
Ironically these were precisely the areas which in 1975 were
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were subcontracted to basically autonomous, professional
expert group whose proposals were fairly uniformly acted
on until 1979. The Marketing Development Bureau (also
basically expatriate and externally responsible) is a
classic example of the damage non-responsible, "expert"
parallel administrations can achieve. The fact that it
took three years (1979-82) to claw back policy and
analysis to Tanzanian control (thereby paralysing strategy
during that battle) is also instructive - but a very
24costly learning process.
Public sector management performance deteriorated in some 
areas - notably accounting - but more often because 
capacity did not grow as rapidly as crises increased demands, 
with a resultant general deterioration and a more marked 
one in strategic and tactical forward planning and budgeting 
and in financial control and performance. The pattern was 
very diverse e.g. in government some departments (notably 
forestry) because more relevant and effective and the 
ingenuity (or capacity) of parastatals to cope varied from 
high (e.g. breweries) to poor (e.g. textiles) to abysmal 
(e.g. NMC). Overall public enterprise surpluses fell from 
5-6% of GDP in the early 1970's and^ probably^ in 1977 to 
about nil in 1981 with the diversity shown in that the 1981 
result is a cross cancelling of profits and losses each 
totalling about 4% of GDP.
Completion of capacity lags, capacity utilisation and 
maintenance all deteriorated. Training of middle level 
personpower began to build up momentum after 1972 but 
remained inadequate^albeit by the end of the decade enrolment 
in specialised (largely user sponsored) institutions was 
comparable to that of formal public secondary schools.
VPart of the performance decline relates to macro projection 
weakness (external to operating units) and part to micro 
over-optimism on costs (inflation) and resource (whether 
budgetary or import) availability. However, failure to 
prioritize, adopt and cut back fast enough over 1978-1980 
exacerbated the impact of resource constraints both in 
respect to overall output levels and financial outturn.
Price management became increasingly incoherent at macro 
level, increasingly unreal given the degree of imbalance 
and,therefore increasingly ineffective from late 1979 
onward. Attempts to protect minimum wage earner and 
peasant real incomes over 1980-81 could not be sustained for 
1982/83 and Price Commission analysis was too dependent on 
(usually too high) capacity utilisation forecasts either 
to protect surpluses in manufacturing/wholesaling or to 
avert the rapid growth of parallel markets.
Foreign exchange pricing from mid 1979 on suffered from
inadequate examination of options, an atypical degree (for
Tanzania) of dogmatism, and inordinate delays in acting
2 6which rendered analysis and action out of date. Until 
1981 the only devaluation option considered was a massive 
single cut; phased smaller adjustments (preferably after 
an initial external resource injection) were not seriously 
analysed. In response to theological sermons cn 40 or 60% 
devaluations a pattern of quasi-theological or abstract 
academic rejection of any foreign exchange price change 
gained force. The 1981 proposals to delink from the rising 
dollar and adjust back to mid 1980 parity with major currencies 
took a year to be decided on and the early 1981 Exchange 
Rate Study conclusions against a 60% devaluation in early 
1981 seem to be perceived as somehow relevant to phased 
8-12% downward adjustments beginning in late 1982 and, 
therefore, at least 60% inflation (say 33% relative to 
industrial economies) later.
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Fiscal performance is clearly the key factor behind
inflationary pressures. As noted,fthis is now basically
caused by revenue stagnation related to manufacturing
output constraints flowing from import limitations.
However, 1977-1979 was marked by relative laxity in
budgeting. While over 1977-78 this was masked by
windfall revenue overruns ,it created a habit hard to reverse
and very damaging from mid 1978 to early 1980. Subsequent
efforts to constrain expenditure and raise revenue have
proven inadequate even though they have been draconic.
Until 1982-83 there were limits on possible rates of
cutting military spending (1979/80 - 1981/82 real cut
perhaps 30%), debt service increases are consequential
on past deficits and the declining revenue base prevented
real (and minimal nominal) increases. Overruns on normal
spending were held to an average of 6-7% which in world
27terms is fairly good. The uncovering of deficits else­
where in the public sector drove subsidies and related 
costs from about Sh 150 million in the initial 1979/80 
budget to Sh 1,427 million in 1981/82.
Strategy and Policy Response , while by definition not an 
initial cause of the crises,has been less coherent, less 
speedy, less consistently articulated and less diligently 
pursued than over 1974-76. This has limited its effectiveness 
and, presumptively, caused the crises to build up greater 
intensity and momentum.
In 1978 the incipient crisis simply was not fully perceived 
and over 1978-80 there were hopes (by no means unique to 
Tanzania) that the "Second Oil Shock" would be as speedily 
followed by the resumption of global output and trade growth 
as the first. Until late 1979 the war prevented concentration 
on economic issues. Over the entire 1979-82 period an 
inordinate amount of time and energy was spent on negotiations 
with external parties which (except for "operating" or balance
t
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of payments support finance) came to little or nothing 
partly because of rigidities in both sides' positions 
but largely (except arguably in 1980) because Tanzania did 
not have a comprehensive, coherent, consistent prioritized 
strategy and because delay in negotiations resulted in the 
crisis worsening and the Tanzanian (or indeed the external) 
proposals becoming impracticable for that reason alone.
The demands of day to day survival and the failure of major 
policy attempts increasingly led to short term stop-gappery, 
febrile partial initiatives and hesitancy to act decisively 
on major priority issues over 1981-82. While hardly surprising 
and partially inevitable (collapse today would render strategy 
tomorrow useless), the overall results have been deeply 
damaging.
Industrial sector crises are largely consequential not 
internal. The rate of technological and personnel capacity 
development has been inadequate (albeit rising) but this is 
hardly a cause of the sharp deterioration in post 1978 
performance - indeed its continuation is partly a consequence 
of the great difficulty of staying in production at all. The 
failure to identify a set of industries suitable for export 
buildup and follow through on them (and failure to ensure 
inputs in some of the cases attempted) has had a significant 
but secondary negative impact (perhaps $20-25 million net 
exports a year or 5% of total actual exports).
2 8The industrial strategy evolved over 1969-1975 (basic 
industry in the sense of vectors covering all basic consumer 
goods, most intermediate and construction inputs and a start 
toward engineering and capital goods) has resulted in 
substantial capacity, relatively low (by African and poor 
country standards) incremental import/output ratios and 
some buildup of sectoral linkages. However, the 1979 on 
period has caught it at a stage when import constraints cripple 
its ability to produce or maintain capacity and prevent filling 
in missing linkages.
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The dominant causes are external (perhaps 75-90% counting 
terms of trade, war and weather and contrasting with 1977 
performance). However, domestic strategic response cannot 
be to 10 or 25% of the problem as the external shocks have 
happened, the terms of trade will not recover appreciably 
in the forseeable future and it is quite inconceivable 
(whatever the logical or normative case for or against) 
that doubled concessional finance in real terms can be 
secured or sustained.
Tanzanian Strategic Responses: Of Sisyphus and the 
Stationery Queen
The panorama of the crises and adumbration of causes may 
suggest a lack of serious response - which would be untrue - 
and a lack of responses which actually mastered the rising 
trend of crises (or falling trend of performance) - which 
certainly is the case. Tanzanian strategic and policy response 
(partly because of its time lags, partialness and optimistic 
projections,but largely because external events and prospects 
worsened very rapidly) resembled Sisyphus trying to roll his 
stone up the hill or the Red Queen in Alice In Wonderland 
who could at best stay in the same place by running flat 
out.
War and weather are not - at least in the Tanzanian context -
easy subjects for effective response. The real military
spending cuts of 1980-82 are targeted to be followed up with
2935% nominal (50% odd real) in 1982/83. Small scale 
irrigation and plausible storage are approaches to offsetting 
weather swings but the first cannot yield major results in 
the short run, and appropriate storage techniques and pattern 
remain partly unanalysed and largely undecided (with central 
large store proponents clashing with decentralised, point of 
purchase or import concentrated, slightly modified godown 
advocates) and will pay off massively only after the next 
run of two or three consecutive good harvests.
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In respect to external balance little is practicable vis a vis 
the terms of trade - response via integrated Commodity 
Programme, commodity agreement and improved Compensatory 
Facility efforts have not - and,in the short term at least; 
seem unlikely to yield - much.
Export volume decline has been targeted as a priority area. 
While both the 1981 and 1982 National Economic Survival 
Programmes export target and related policy/resource 
allocation sections are analytically weak (and 1982 in 
particularly grossly over-optimistic), a growing response 
exists. But raising import allocations for exports 
(including transport and processing) in the context of 
declining import capacity and providing real price incentives 
to crops with declining global real prices in the context of 
an economy with declining real per capita purchasing power 
(despite - until 1981 - real per capita output growth) have 
proven intractable. 19 81 saw export volume growth, but 
largely because the 1980-81 coffee crop was a cyclical peak 
above both the low 1979-80 performance and the (rising) 
trend.
Specific export rehabilitation/growth programmes appear to 
be working in coffee and may do so in sisal, but in respect 
to cashew, cotton and tobacco require major rethinking.
Two major resource export projects with high priority - paper 
and amonia/urea - should give a structural boost to net exports 
(over 50% of 1981 levels) but only after basic debt repayment
i.e. in the 1990's not the 1980's.
Indiscriminate use of supplier credit has (with a twelve month 
lag between problem identification and action) been halted. 
Arrears and debt payment delays are certainly identified as 
problems but given import capacity restraints/requirements 
they have continued to worsen (albeit more slowly than in
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1979 and early 1980). Import capacity allocation is more coherent 
(subject to the fact that applications now bear no relation 
to actual desired allocations making really efficient decisions 
virtually impossible) but pouring a half litre into four litre 
jugs produces demonstrably unsatisfactory results.
The attempt to reduce expansion of (unusable) capital stock 
in favour of maintenance and operating imports has made 
uneven progress. «It became fairly fully embodied in the 
1981/82 and - especially - 1982/83 Budgets and on the external 
finance side has resulted in maintenance and balance of 
payment support finance rising from perhaps 5% of concessionary 
inflows in 1977/78 to about 33% in 1981/82. How high a 
degree of consistent articulation and systematic implementation 
has been achieved is less clear.
Agricultural institutional and policy reform has been a 
priority item since 1979. But until 1982 limited action other 
than - somewhat doubtfully effective given inflationary impact- 
nominal grower price increases and - potentially more effective - 
relative price realignment was done. At present a priority 
list exists: prompt collection from and payment to producers
(whose deterioration over 1978-81 may have affected output more 
negatively and parallel marketing "positively" as actual 
price trends), continued relative price adjustment by crop 
and region,specific targets by crop and area linked to 
resource allocations, rehabilitated transport and processing, 
cost control (especially on storage losses, excessive transport 
and administration) in parastatals, overall production and 
parastatal financial data strengthening and development of 
adequate storage. Input supply improvement is primarily a 
matter of better transport and allocation among crops.
Research and extension productivity improvement (or perhaps 
creation except £or a few crops and areas), stepping up 
improved animal drawn and hand implement production and use 
and small scale irrigation are seen as needing initial action 
but as having long term, not initial crisis resolution payoff.
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However, a checklist of priorities is far from an articulated, 
operational strategy.
Public sector management performance has been identified as a 
priority area but without clear operational priorities for 
improving it nor - beyond a handful of cases - micro 
programmes at operating unit level. The 1982 National 
Bureau of Accountants and Auditors report may lead to a 
forward dynamic there as may Treasury 1980 onward financial 
monitoring and control tightening.
However, practicable short term incentives have been hard to 
devise - output is too contingent on exogenous events to make 
productivity bonuses or deductions broadly realistic while 
the 1981 salary increases at best indicated managers were 
not wholly forgotten. Similarly greater discipline, self 
discipline and accountability for results are not easy to 
enforce when maximum effort at best usually leaves one 
standing still and falling real living standards/shortages 
provide pressure and opportunity for moonlighting, parallel 
marketing or worse. However, the rather shotgun approach 
to these issues has certainly done less good than a planned 
one and by arbitrariness (and hitting innocent bystanders) 
may have reduced willingness to act decisively more than 
sloth of malpractice.
Price management,while improved in detail,remains incoherent 
(or unworkable) at macro level . The nil minimum wage increase 
for 1982/83 implies a nil agricultural price increase for 1983 
(which is clearly not going to happen). The foreign exchange 
price policy delay means - since the very dramatic 1981 
decisions on 1982 export crop prices - huge marketing board 
deficits (now - quite rightly - transferred from the banking 
system to the Treasury) and inflationary pressures. Price 
ceilings cannot work at present supply levels and rate of credit
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expansion. Market management can restrain price movements 
and avert self justifying margin creep under conditions of 
balance or moderate, intermittent shortages (1973, to a 
degree 1974-75, 1976-78) but not close the type of gaps 
currently existing.
Fiscal policy response has been targeted on recurrent 
budget deficit elimination - or at least reduction, albeit 
the 1982 "Bluebook" Structural Adjustment Programme For 
Tanzania appears to downgrade that goal (and with it, one 
must logically conclude, reduction of inflation). Real 
expenditure - excluding debt service and public enterprise 
deficit/rehabilitation cover - has been cut, but the increase 
in these two items (in the latter case partly a matter of 
discovery and of shifting the burden from the banking system) 
and the deterioration of real recurrent revenue performance 
despite higher tax rates and improved collection have kept 
the recurrent deficit and overall bank borrowing requirement 
rising in nominal and static or slightly rising in real terms 
since the initial 1978-79 recurrent deficit. Here the sectoral 
policy response and priorities may be coherent and correct 
(or too draconic as to maintenance and basic services) but,in 
the absence of consistent price management strategy and 
increased import capacity effectively used to restore manu­
factured output,they can only avert or delay catastrophe.
Industrial performance policy responses are clear at overall 
level but do not lead coherently to operational micro level 
policies or allocations. There is stress on capacity maintenance 
and utilisation and not - except for export directed or key 
import bottleneck cases on new capacity but how this relates 
to partly completed plant is unclear. Similarly import 
allocation priorities are clear, but are stated in terms 
requiring about twice the possible overall foreign exchange 
budget item so cannot actually guide policy. Calls for
substitution of local inputs do not seem to be backed by 
meaningful support to locating or developing them. Admittedly 
the basic problems of capacity utilisation (including for 
export) and of reducing the incremental direct operating 
import to output ratio from 20-25% to 10-15% all need 
unavailable foreign exchange,but if that does block major 
improvement both allocation (however painful) and secondary 
productivity improvement policies could be given more 
systematic attention.
Energy policy is coherent, clear and - up to a point - 
operational. Petroleum product consumption - via price, 
substitution, rationing and - much less acceptably - physical 
shortages is down 20% odd on 1977. The sector yields both 
taxes and profits. Hydro power and electricity grid 
development a,re the subject of serious forward planning. 
However, the resource shortage is delaying closing the 
grid gaps and has blocked the only economically rational 
route to hydro power expansion. Coal development has begun 
but poses unresolved technical and cost problems. The 
identification of the wood problem has been in advance of 
a national crisis (though not of crises in certain regions 
and in respect of tobacco), whether the buildup of 
reafforestation (e.g. woodlot) programmes will become 
adequate remains less than clear especially given the general 
crisis setting.
The presentation of these sectoral or programmatic national 
responses illustrates the continuing absence of a coherent, 
prioritized ,articulated overall strategy.. The 1980 
Structural Adjustment Programme collapsed under the pressure 
of lags, worsened external contexts and failure to conclude 
the World Bank (though, ironically, not the IMF) component. 
The 1981 and 1982 tranches of the National Economic Survival 
Programme ,while formally adopted and partially articulated;
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have not proven to be fully coherent nor have they been 
fully adhered to in detailed articulation and action. If 
the 1982 "Bluebook" is to be the start of such a strategic 
response,it will require clearer priorities (and much more 
emphasis on macro price management and fiscal outturn), 
articulation both to test for consistency and to turn a somewhat 
gappy collation of broad principles and bits and pieces of 
(.usually, but not always, evidently sensible) micro policy 
ihto a set of policies backed by quantitative allocations
and practicable targets. Further this must be done promptly 
or it too will become dated by worsening events and with 
determined enforcement at the operational stage to avoid 
micro deviations (or inaction) rapidly undermining what 
will be at best a fragile construct.
The task on the response front is considerably more difficult
than copying anybody's extant prescriptions. Accelerated
Developments in Sub-Saharan Africa's strategy is no exception'
because it is equally non articulated, non coherently
prioritized in anyoperational senseias well as too generalised
for a direct fit to any one country quite apart from serious
empirical feasibility (e.g. re its export led growth and
doubled aid prescription and assumption of general private
sector capacity and benignity) and its apparent normative
assumptions ("to him that hath shall be given and from him
that hath not even that little which he hath shall be taken")
31problems. Tanzania's basic policy and instrumental mix 
is not particularly ideological (nor have the so called "pro 
capitalist" strands been notably effective) and switching 
to an intensified inequality, reduced access, increased passive 
dependence strategy is not practicable without a new political 
and social base after an intervening collapse,as to attempt 
one within the present framework would assuredly destroy its 
self confidence, credibility, legitimacy and -therefore - 
operationality in a very short space of time.
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1 Through a Glass Dimly........ '
The downside potential of the Tanzanian economy is massive - 
to put the prospects in jargon. The cost in terms of human 
deprivation, social and political collapse and engulfment 
in a quagmire from which clawing back would take decades is 
morally appalling.
To outline doomsday scenarios has a macabre fascination and may 
be useful either to shock advocates of 'steady as you go' 
navigation into noticing that a waterfall lies immediately 
ahead or to guide 'entrepreneurs of adversity' (or wingless 
two legged vultures) tactics. However, the fascination would, on 
the present author's part, be pure masochism and his concern for 
the care and feeding of vultures is negative while there is no 
need to inform Tanzanians or Tanzanian leaders that they are in 
the midst of a worsening crisis. Therefore these concluding 
notes are partial preconditions for a stabilisation and recovery 
strategy, however daunting or unlikely to succeed that may 
appear to be.
1. Tanzanian (and external cooperating body) projections of ext­
ernal events must be cautious and pessimistic not - as has 
been the case to date - overly optimistic. The global 
economic crisis shows no signs of 'turning the corner' and 
the fact that the weather cycle must eventually come to a 
good year is no basis for projections used in three year 
programming.
2. Tanzanian (and external cooperating body) projections for 
speed of response to policy changes, resource injections and 
strengthening must be slower; the crisis has exacerbated 
every latent weakness, emptied pipelines so that new resource 
injections will take 8-12 months to halt declines in most 
sectors; and dulled the enthusiasm and initiative needed to 
galvanise rapid change.
Tanzanian decision takers must achieve a comprehensive, 
priority focused strategy (not a kaleidoscope of partially 
conflicting pieces with unclear relative importance), 
articulate a possible pattern of policies and resource 
allocations from the strategy and proceed to implementation 
speedily and with regular monitoring.
Tanzanian implementation and monitoring must be disciplined 
despite the severe costs of any strategy, policy and resource 
allocation package meeting the critieria of short run 
feasibility and long run sustainability but it must also be 
subject to correction if major divergencies in external 
setting or domestic reponses from projection occur.
Both Tanzanian decision takers and would be cooperators 
must accept both that, whatever the merits and demerits of 
1967-72 and 1974-77 strategies(neither is viable today; that 
whatever the weight of external causes domestic restructuring is 
essential (the late 1960s world economic setting cannot be 
whistled back into being nor can a major international economic 
order restructuring be projected as a safe basis for national
strategy), but that without enhanced as well as better
utilised external resource injections the probable cost burdens 
and extremely slow payoff of any such restructuring will 
render it impossible to implement even if the strategy is 
devised and articulated realistically. (A ratio of exports 
to imports of 50% with imports 25-40% below the minimum needed 
to operate and maintain the basic economic structure cannot be 
brought to an acceptable - say 80% - ratio in less than
a decade.)
Tanzanians must be less ready to accept external technical 
and institutional advice on faith (especially when their own 
experts demur) and external cooperators more willing to accept 
the extreme fallibility (for whatever reasons) of their 
own past (and thus probably present as well) advice. Both
need to realise that a dialogue not a lecture, an argument 
not a shouting match is needed on areas of divergence and 
that a donated or imposed strategy will not work. Unless a 
basically Tanzanian devised, oriented and believed stratecv 
emerges;no amount of advice, coercio.n and help can recreate 
a forward dynamic.
These points are in a sense procedural or at best mega economic 
for three reasons:
a. there is not adequate space to present a coherent strategy- 
policy-allocation package;
b. nor is there adequate data to do so partly because of external 
resource uncertainties and partly because domestic priorities 
do not appear to be clear, consistent and practicable;
c. and in any event such an exercise by one technician (let 
alone an expatriate one) would be totally inconsistent 
with at least the last four basic conditions set out above.
However, it may be worth stating that the preceeding analysis 
does not suggest that domestic economic integration (self 
reliance), absolute poverty eradication and universal access to 
basic services, lessened inequality (including greater participation) 
and public sector leadership are inherently ’unsound. They worked 
reasonable well over 1967-1977; 'the errors of 1975-1982 are more 
deviations from than aspects of them and the experience of African 
economies with a very wide range of strategic and political 
economic diversity is so depressingly similar as to cast doubts 
on ideological or sweeping political economic model interpretations. 
That does not deny the need for basic change in priorities, tactics 
and timing. Restoring import capacity (especially earned import 
capacity, ie exports) and production growth are now crucial to each 
of Tanzania's basic goals even if the means to achieving them 
are either not directly relevant to,or represent a partial, 
temporary and reversible divergence from them.
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A conclusion full of hope and bright prospects would offend 
against the warning on realism in projections. The most 
positive possible citation may be the Lord Krishna's to Arjuna 
while a battle hung in the balance
Not fare well but fare forward, voyagers.
1
Year
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
19 76
1977
1978
1979
1980
TABEE 1
lia lance of Payments: Trade Balance
in Goods and Services: 1965 ~ 1980
2 3 
Merchandise Trade
4 5
Balance on 
Services
6
Col. 4 as % of 
Current GDP
7
(Col. 4 + Col. 5) 
as 1 of Current 
GDP.
Exports 
(T. Sh. in)
Imports 
(T. Sh. in)
Balance 
(T. Sh. m)
1,475.9 1 410.0 65.9 - 1.07 -
1,889.9 1,694.9 195.0 -72.9 2.77 1.73
1,796.9 1,637.6 159.0 - 2.15 i
1,719.0 1,833.7 -114.7 - -1.45 -
1,756.5 1,710.1 46.4 177.3 .55 2.67
1,797.2 2,274.2 -477.0 225.9 -5.21 -2.74
1,913.1 2,725.6 -812.5 208.8 -8.11 -6.03
2,312.7 2,882.9 -570.2 256.0 -9.99 -3.7
2,581.1 3,478.9 -897.7 190.1 -6.85 -5.4
2,878.1 5,377.0 -2,498.9 .181.7 -15.6 -14.49
n
j C 5,709.4 -2,945.4 400.9 -15.49 -12.96
4,108.0 5,349.5 -1,241.5 466.4 -5.3 -3.3
4,464.2 6,161.3 -1,697.1 155.7 -5.0 -5.2
3,670.6 8,797.7 -5,127.1 210.1 -15.3 -14.72
4,484.3 9,073.2 -4,583.9 306.0 -12.2 -11.37 •
4,702.2 10,261.9 -5,559.7 156.1 -15.6 -15.1
o_f Tanzania, Economic and Operations Reports various issues, National Accounts, various 
s; Green et al (1980).
estimates
TABLE 2 .
Public Finance/Gross Domestic Product Ratios 1961-1980
(stated as % of GDP)
1900/61 1963/64 1966/67 1969/70 1972/73 1975/76 1977/7 8 197 8/79 1979/80
Recurrent Revenue 13.03 14.2 15. 5 2 0. 1 2 2 . 8 20.9 21.7 2 1 . 6 2 2 . 6
Recurrent Expenditure 13.6 13.7 15. 5 19.5 2 1 . 1 19.8 19.8 26.0 27. 5
Capital Expenditure 2 . 6 2.9 4.5 7.8 7.0 1 2 . 0 1 1 . 8 15.1 15.8
Total Expenditure 16. 2 16.6 2 0 . 0 27 .3 28.1 31.8 31.6 41. 1 • 43.3
Notos
1. Includes Debt Service in full. Technically debt redemption should not be included.
3. 'On budget' items only.
3. Excludes Colonial Welfare and Development Payments.
Sources
Adapted from "Twenty Year Hevlew" Annex Tables on Gross Domestic Product and Trends in Government Finances; 
Financial Statement and Revenue Estimates (various years); World Dank, The Economic Development of Tanganika.
TABLE 3
Makeup of Recurrent Revenue 1961 -00
(in Percentages)
1960/61 1963/64 1966/67 19SV70 1972/73 1975/76 1977/78 1972/79 1973/BO
Major Direct Taxes i> I 22.5 26.5 25.5 24.5 39- 36 5 30 • 37
Income (2C) (20) (23) (22.5) (22) (35) (27.5) (23) (31)
Export (1 ) (2.5) ( 4) ( 3 ) (2.5) (4) ( 9 ) ( 7) ( 6)
Major Indirect Taxes 44.5 40 41 46 - 38* 53 51.5 53 50
Customs and Excise"^ (44.5) (40) (41) (33.5) (24i5) (17.9) (21) (16) (■15)
Sales Tax on Domestic Goods ( O' ) ( o) ( o) (12.5) (13.5) (35.9) (30.5) (37) (35)
Parastatal Dividends 0 • 0 1 3 3 2 2 3 3
Other Sources 34.5 37.5 31.5 25.5 37.5 6 10 14 10
Tbtal 0 100
— —/*-/—1 — - “ 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100
2External Ti-ade Taxes 27 31.5 33 25.5 18 15 25 23 21
Notoe; 1. Includes Sales Tax on Importo. Excise amalgameted into Sales
Thx 1977/78 - 1910/19.
2. Import and Export Duties plus Sales Thx on Imports.
Sources: As Eor Table 2.
TABLE 4
nf Vhidz/ntnrv Finnncin/i Requirement 1963/64 - 1979/80
(In Í)
Ratloa To GDP 1963/64 1966/67 196 i/70 1972/73 1975/76 1977/78 1976/79 197^80
Capital Budget 2.9 4.5 7.8 7.0 12.0 1 1 . 0 15.1 15.8
Plus Recurrent Budget Deficit 
or minus Surplus ( )
Budgetary Financing Requirement
External Finance
Domestic Finanee^
Grants/Tranafera/ etb.^
Non-Bank Borrowing 
Bank Borrowing
(0.5) (o.o) (0.6) (1.7) (1.1) (1.9) 4.4 4.9
2.4 4.5 7.2 5.3 10.9 9.9 19.5 20.8
1.0 1.9 1.6 3.3 5.5 4.2 8.0 10.5
1 ;4 2.6 5;6 2;0 5.4 5:7 11:5 10.3
(1 ¿4) 
( - ) 
( - )
(2.6) 
( - ) 
(.- )
(0i 7) 
(2:2) 
(2.7)
(0:2)
(1:8)
(O.O)
(0.5)
(1:8)
(3.1)
(0:5)
(2.5)
(2.0)
(0:4)
(1:4)
(9.7)
(0.3)
(1:4)
(8.6)
Ratloa to Financing Requirement
External Finance 39 43 22 63 50 42 41 51
Bonk Borrowing - - 38 1 28 19 49 41
Ratioa to Capital Budget
External Finance 33 43 20 47 45 36 54 67
Hotoo:
1. Includea grants, lonna to government. Some snail private agency grant's raay be niaclnssified under donostic. Includea
counterpart l,lunda iron food aid ani balance. of paynents support finance in year1 paid Into Development Revenue account.
2. Excludes donestio counterpart funds from external aid (see Note 1),
3. Early year figures appear to include some borrowing eg from Cotton Authority, East African Currency Board. Later years 
Include resources from special Funda in year allocated/paid over to Development Revenue.
Sources: Adopted from "Twenty Year Review" Annex Tables on Public Finance, GDP; Financial Statement and Revenue Estimates 
(various years)
TABLE 5
ELEMENTS OF THE RECURRENT BUDGET AND SOURCES OP GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT FINANCE
1966/67 - 1979/80
(alia, miIlion) •
1966/67
1
*973/14 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 197S/79*
.........  ...
1979/SO*
I* Tux Revenue 1017.2 2937.8 .3*60.6 3302.5 4672.0 5M3.o 5854.0 6154.0 j
2, Other Revenuea 6.8 85.2 781.7 616.0 607.0 748-1 830.0 1116.0
3. Total Recurrent Revenue 1024.0 3023.0 3942.3 3918-5 5279.0 6091-I 6684.0 7270.0
4* Recurrent Expenditure 979.7 2785.O 3961.1 3715.6 5108.0 5769.0 8907.0 9094.0 S
5. Sui'plua 44.3 238.0 -18.8 202.9 171.0 322.1 -2223.O -1824.0
6, Development Expenditure Financed qy: 294.4 1 4 4 2 . 0 2221.2 2253.0 2731.0 3388.0 4771.0
4800.0
a, Surplua on Recurrent Budget 44.3 238.0 -18.8 209.9 171.0 322.1 -2223.0 -I824.O
D. Non-Bank borrowing 59.8 196.0 362.0 336.0 276.0 488.O 569.0 443.0
c. Borrowing from Banka I8.9 521.0 834.0 570.0 -I7O .5 464.O 2912.5 2802.1
d. Other Sourcea 44.4 6.0 6.0 113.1 1052.3 744.9 1085.1 778.9
e. External Loanu and Granta 127.0 48I.O 1038,0 1031.0 1402.0 1369.0 2427.0 2600.0
* Proviaional
gourco; Economic Survey (Varioua iaauoa) and Budget Documenta
TABLE 6
Gross Bank Lending 1966 — 1979*
Cantral Government (shs. r.illion^
Bank of Commercial ITon—Government
Tanzania 3 a.* kg Total Borrowing
1966 72.5 98,0 170.5 806.9
1968 64.9 8 0 .1 145-0 819.8
1969 75.6 168.3 243.9 964.1
1970 291.3 164.7 456.0 1141.3
1973 484.9 558.6 1043.5 1566.9
1974 863.3 671.2 1334; 5 2456.4
1976 1477.2 1895.1 3372.3 3513.6
1977 I445.6 1878.7 3324.3 3847.7 .
1978 2041.8 1898 .2 3939.5 5153.1
1979 4515.6 2589.3 7104.9 6413.2
* The figures are given in quarterly averages
Source: Bank of Tanzania, Economic and Coorazions Report (rar-i CU3 years)
NOTES
Reg Green has been a student of the political economy of 
Tanzania since 1964 and a full or part time advisor to 
various Tanzanian bodies since 1965. This paper contains 
his personal interpretation and views and is in no sense to 
be taken to represent those of any Tanzanian institution.
Equally while he has made a number of the critical points before, 
the present perspective is that of late 1982 and in part 
comprises changes of emphasis and interpretation which, if 
correct, means that portions of his previous analysis and/or 
advice were either wrong or inadequately emphasised relative 
to other aspects.
For a somewhat fuller analysis - but also one before the last 
half year's worsening - see R. H. Green, 'Political Economic 
Adjustment and IMF Conditionality: The Case of Tanzania
1974-1981' in J. Williamson (ed), IMF Conditionality, Institute 
for International Economics, Washington (in press).
This was the position in 1981 and appears to remain the case 
(1981 from Bank of Tanzania data to be published in 1981 
Annual Report).
Even the 30% rate assumes 6 years to clearance. Any faster 
progress would require IMF facilities and/or exporting country 
consolidation loans of - say - $200 million in excess of medium 
term operating import bolstering requirements.
This assumes 20% of food is consumed in quasi urban and urban 
areas and that this supply is basically additional to (not 
out of) basic rural supply.
This is slightly worse than the real position since 1980/81 
the burden of public enterprise losses has been largely shifted from 
bank loans to Recurrent Budget payments which causes an evident 
rise in expenditure balanced in part by a concealed fall in 
de facto bad debt creation.
This understates the real rise in costs though,given the 
sample purchase base of much of the basket and a number of 
index boosting apparent errors,by less than might be expected.
Actual hunger is more related to purchasing power declines 
than to actual non-availability. But sugar, cooking oil, 
milk, bread, wheat flour and - at times - rice and maize 
flour are absolutely scarce. (Bananas, potatoes, millet, 
surghum and cassava are not nor are eggs, meat, onions, 
tomatoes, oranges with fish and poultry erratic.)
This estimate is based on constant price GDP evolution reduced 
for population and military expenditure growth and terms of 
trade losses. On the face of GDP based estimates of personal 
consumption growth (eg in 1982 World Development Report) the 
decline would appear to be much less,but this seems implausible.
- f a ­
10. This is based on rising real official, private and parallel 
market prices for agricultural porducts taken together 
since 1975 (albeit not for industrial/export crops nor for 
all foods taken separately) and a conservative estimate of 
total sales growth.
11. This is not a deterministic or fatalistic statement, past 
decisions affect the present and present ones the future.
12. For a much fuller presentation and analysis of 1972-78 see 
R. H. Green, D. Rwegasira and B. Van Arkadie, Economic 
Shocks and National Policy Making: Tanzania in the 1970s,
Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, 1981. but also see
R. Liebenthal, Adjustment in Low Income Africa 1974-78, World 
Bank, Washingotn, 1981, pp 29-39.
13. This may relate to an objectively more difficult situation 
and/or exhaustion from 1974-76 and wartime crisis management, 
but the failure to achieve coherence, focus and action remains 
a fact, whatever its causes.
14. The author believes it was partly real - late 1979 trends
would have led to collapse or at best 1982 crises intensity
levels by June 1980.
15. Again this is an empirical more than a normative judgement,
especially in 1 980-81 the author was too involved to be an
impartial evaluator and still cannot see what systematic 
alternatives were then open.
16. The good weather year food surpluses exports offset a very 
small proportion of the bad year imports.
17. This has been the subject of debate. Accurate Tanzanian 
based import price data do not exist nor are global analogues 
satisfactory. However, the joint World Bank/Tanzania appointed 
Tanzania Assistance Group ('Three Wise Men1) came to roughly 
the same conclusion of massive terms of trade deterioration 
and real import volume falls.
18. Much of it related to a cyclical peak 1980-81 coffee crop 
and a one year partial recovery in cashew nut picking.
19. Cf.Green, Rwegasira, Van Arkadie on this issue and on why 
action was not seen as crucial/practicable earlier. This 
issue has been debated in Tanzania at least since 1969 when 
it became clear that Tanzania's very late 'initial export 
opening up' rise had plateaued in the mid-1960s. That boom 
- which was not the result of any conscious export strategy 
by the colonial or independent governments - and the fact 
that Tanzania became independent with a trade surplus 
created a context in which export development strategy did 
not seem particularly pressing, until external balance 
projections for the 1 969-74 Five Year Plan were drawn up.
- c -
20. 1980-1982 imports have been so low that some arrears would 
have built up and some of the public sector (perhaps 25%) and 
private sector (perhaps 20% dominated by lorries) supplier 
credits have been economically prudent.
21. Data do not show this clearly because international tables 
tend to exclude Chinese transfers (two thirds of Tanzania's 
total during the peak of Uhuru Railway construction) and 
Tanzanian budgetary and external transaction handling of 
railway finance was neither transparant nor consistent.
22. Tanzania has been very cautious in use of medium term bank 
loans - probably wisely since large floating rate five to 
seven year loans contracted in 1973-74 or 1977-78 (when they 
were available) would have tended to defer adjustment over 
1974-76 and 1980 as well as producing unmanageable interest and 
repayment or rollover problems from 1979 onward. On large, 
technically complex and/or export marketing intensive projects 
Tanzania has, in principle, welcomed joint ventures.
In practice this policy has been rather passive outside the 
hydrocarbon and mining sectors with individual exceptions 
in tyres (USA), tanning (Sweden) and shoes (Italy).
23. The data series are conflicting and unreliable. Only those 
in National Accounts are based on decentralised total output 
estimates. ILO and FAO data analysis (and fieldwork in the 
latter case) tend to confirm a food production trend growth 
of the order of 4
24. Clearly, Tanzania should have exerted supervision and control 
much earlier (indeed, never accepted the hiving off of policy 
and planning to an autonomous unit). But once the Ministry 
had had its technical functions moved to the MDB, analysing 
its proposals and performance, let alone reasserting control, 
was objectively difficult - especially since MDB was believed 
to speak with the authority and expertise of the World Bank 
behind it.
25. Post 1975 figures are open to doubt because of the increasing
proportion of delayed accounts and of the share of these which,
when received, show rapid financial performance deterioration.
26. Of R. H. Green ’Political Economic Adjustment...' op cit, 
for a fuller discussion.
27. These had previously been financed as if they were working 
capital. In the agricultural cases, the subsidies are
de facto (since grower prices are above export or import parity) 
to producers while in the transport sector they are to users.
28. For fuller accounts see M. Fransman (editor) Industry and
Accumulation in Africa, Heineman 1982. For fuller accounts 
in chapters by M. A. Bienefeld, A. Coulson, R. H. Green,
A. Singh.
“ d ”
29. See Table 1, "Bluebook" (Structural Adjustment Programme 
for Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, 19&2)
30. The regional price differentials are intended to encourage 
specialisation. Whether cross-subsidized prices in remote 
areas - which are highly grower price effective at raising 
total marketed output and do bring poor peasants into the 
process of development by providing a "vent for surplus" 
on orthodox Smithian (Adam not Ian!) lines but are also 
transport cost intensive - are to be altered and, if so, 
how remains under consideration.
31. For a much fuller survey of and commentary on the Report 
see IDS Bulletin Vol. 14, No. 1, Accelerated Development
in SuE-Saharan Africa; What Agendas for Action?, C . Allison 
and R.H. Green (editors), January 1983. (Preliminary text 
available at this conference.)
32. The optimism of the will does remain - Krishna and Arjuna 
subsequently did carry the field and the day.
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